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168 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 34
In 1945 a California court upheld a curfew ordinance which made it a
crime for any parent, guardian or other person having custody and control
of any minor under 18 years of age to permit such minor to "remain" or
"loiter" upon the streets or public places between the hours of 9 P. M. and
4 A. M.7 It is interesting to note that the above ordinance originally made it
a crime to allow a minor under 16 to "remain, stroll upon, use, loiter on or
be upon any street. . ." etc. -and that it was amended to read "remain" or
"loiter" so as to narrow its purview.
A perusal of curfew ordinances enacted in several of the larger cities in
North Dakota may serve to' illustrate both desirable and undesirable features
of such ordinances. One of the ordinances conspicuously fails to designate
the hour of the day at which the minor may again depart from his dwei-
ling.8 Some ordinances provide for exceptions for emergency -or necessity
situations' but others do not. 10 None of the ordinances studied apply if the
minor is in the presence of his parents or guardian," or if the minor is en-
gaged in a lawful trade or occupation. 12 In none of the ordinances examined
is an exception provided for a minor who is married or who is otherwise
emancipated from his parents.
13
It is submitted that to satisfy both legal and practical considerations the
ordinance should provide exceptions if the minor is engaged in a lawful oc-
cupation, if be is on an emergency errand or one directed by his parents or
guardian,14 if the minor is married 1 or otherwise emancipated, or if he can
show reasonable cause as to why the ordinance should not apply. 1 The more
recent ordinances prohibit merely loitering in lieu of total exclusion.1 7 City
attorneys indicate that in most jurisdictions curfew ordinances may be justified
as an exercise of the police power; however, the ordinance must be both
reasonable and carefully drawn.' s
JOHN M. ORBAN.
CRIMINAL LAW - INDICTMENTS AND INFORMATION - SUFFICIENCY OF UNI-
FORM TRAFFIC TICKET AS AN INFORMATION. - Defendant was issued a uni-
form traffic ticket which required him to appear the following day before a
police justice. The defendant, on his plea of guilty, was convicted of operat-
ing a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The Court of Appeals of New York
valid.); Mayor of Memphis v. Winfield, 27 Tenn. (8 Humph.) 706 (1848) (Ordinance
to keep Negroes off the streets after 10 P.M. held invalid.).
7. People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d 862, 161 P.2d 498 (1945).
8. See Grand Forks Revised Ordinances, c. IX, art. 1, (1948).
9. See Fargo Revised Ordinances, c. X, art. 1 (1952); Jamestown, ordinance 141, 1
1 (1953).
10. See Dickinson, ordinance 261, I 3 (1956); Grand Forks Revised Ordinances, c.
IX, art. 1 (1948). See also Bismarck, ordinance 476, § 1 (1935); Devils Lake, ordinance
359, 1 1 (1953)
11. Ibid; Fargo Revised Ordinances, c. X, art. 1 (1952); Jamestown, ordinance 141,
§ 1 (1953).
12. Dickinson is an exception. See ordinance 261, § 3 (1956).
13. Another facet of curfew ordinances but beyond the province of this case is the
culpability of parents or guardians if the minor violates the ordinance. Some ordinances
make the parent or guardian responsible whether they have knowledge of the violation or
not. Others employ what is considered to be the sounder approach, making the parents or
guardians responsible only if they knowingly permit the ordinance violation.
14. See American Municipal Association, Curfew Ordinances, p. 2 (1948).
15. See Florida Children's Commission, Reports on Curfew Laws (1956).
16. See Albert Lea, Minn., ordinance 1293, 1 1 (1955).
17. See American Municipal Association, Curfew Ordinances, p. 2. (1948).
18. See op. cit. supra., n. 18.
RECENT CASES
held, three justices dissenting, that a uniform traffic ticket is not a sufficient
information to be used as a pleading, and that the absence of a verified in-
formation was a jurisdictional defect which was not waived by a plea of
guilty. People v. Scott, 3 N.Y.2d 148, 143 N.E.2d 901 (1957).
The office of an information is not only to give the court jurisdiction, but
it is also the pleading by the state which: informs the defendant of the
charge against him,' enables the defendant to prepare for trial, and protects
the accused from being tried a second time for the same offense.2 At com-
mon law all proceedings of a criminal or quasi-criminal nature, except con-
tempt proceedings, had to be initiated by an information. 3
The express issue considered in the present case was the determination of
whether the uniform traffic ticket met the requirements of an information.
Research fails- to reveal any other case where this question has been decided
by the supreme tribunal of any state; 4 however, one authority in this field
indicates that the preparation of a formal information is required to initiate
an action for a motor vehicle offense.r
Advocates of the uniform traffic ticket take the position that it inform.,
the violator of the exact nature of the violation charged and further that it
acquaints the public with the kind of unsafe maneuvers which result in
accidents. 6 The dissenting justices in the instant case view a traffic ticket as
performing a duel function of a summons, which notifies the defendant to
appear in court, and a complaint which informs the accused in full detail as
to what he is charged with doing, or failing to do, contrary to law.7 Thus, it
is apparent that two of the requirements for a valid information have been
complied with, but no mention is made as to whether or not the require-
ment of protection from double jeopardy is met.
The majority of the court in the principal case hold that a traffic ticket
serves as a mere notification to the accused to appear in a given court on a
given day at which time and place he will be charged with a specific crimc.8
A recent lower court decision in North Dakota is in accord, with the prin-
ciple case.9 In that case, the court refused to permit a traffic ticket to suffice
1. See, e.g., N.D. Rev. Code § 29-0113 (1943). See also People v. Gade, 6 N.Y.S.2d
1018 (City Ct. 1938); Snapp v. State, 2 Okla. Crim. 515, 103 Pac. 553 (1909);
People v. Jacoby, 304 N.Y. 33, 105 N.E.2d 613, 618 (1952) (dissent).
2. People v. Schulz, 301 N.Y. 495, 95 N.E.2d 815 (1950); People v. Zambounis,
251 N.Y. 94, 167 N.E. 183 (1929). In State v. Tiaden, 63 N.W.2d 272 (N. D. 1955)
the court stated that one test of the sufficiency of an information is whether it will protect
the accused against a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
3. 8 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, 15427 (1950).
4. This is no doubt due to the fact that the amount involved is not great enough
to warrant appeal to a court whose opinions are published.
5. This topic is given very extensive coverage in 8 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automo-
bile Law and Practice, § 5422 and § 5431 (1950). However, in Yunker v. Quillin, 202
Ore. 362, 275 P.2d 240 (1954) a traffic ticket did suffice as an information For a traffic
violation b.cause of an express statutory provision.
6. 41 A.B.A.J. 869 (1955).
7. People v. Scott, 3 N.Y.2d 148, 143 N.E.2d 901, 905 (1957). it is interesting tn
note that New York has sought to escape the rigors of statutory Formality in f'rimnal pro-
ccedings for motor vehicle violations by express statutory provision which provides that
all violations of the vehicle and affic law were "traffic infractions" and not crimes un-
less expressly declared felonies or misdemeanors. This N as to prevent the stigma of
criminality which attached to a conviction of one of these trivial offenses. See 57 Colum.
L. Rev. 441 (1957). The court was permitted to deviate, n the basi. of the statute,
from the regular procedure as the traffic infraction was not a crime in Lea v. MacDuff,
205 Misc. 24, 126 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
8. People v. Scott, 3 N.Y.2d 148, 143 N.E.2d 901 (1957).
9. State v. Trygg. (Dist. Ct., 4th Jud. Dist., N.D. 1957) Reported in 34 N. Dak.
L. Rev. 84 (1958). Another aspect of North Dakota law on this subject is section 113
19581
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as an information in a criminal proceeding for a reckless driving charge be-
cause statutory procedure had not been followed. The court further indicated
that such a ticket would not even suffice as a summons.10
No doubt the volume of motor vehicle violations necessitates expeditious
disposition of offenders, but it is submitted that such a situation does not
justify circumvention of the rights of the accused by eliminating the establish-
ed statutory procedure. There is possibly a present need to amend the exist-
ing statutory procedure, but until the legislature enacts such statutes the
courts are under a duty to administer the procedure that has been adopted
and is currently in force.
DENNIS M. SOBOLIK.
DIVORCE - PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - ALIMONY OR JUDGMENT
DEBT REGARDING IMPRISONMENT FOR CONTEMPT. - Parties contemplating a
divorce entered into a property settlement agreement which was adopted and
made part of the divorce decree. The husband's failure to abide by the agree-
ment led to a contempt proceeding. The Supreme Court of California, one
justice dissenting, held that the payments due under the agreement consti-
tuted an adjustment of property interests, rather than alimony, support, or
maintenance,' and therefore was a "debt" within the constitutional prohibi-
tion against imprisonment for debt.2 Bradley v. Superior Court of California,
48 Cal. 2d- 310 P.2d 634 (1957).
Contempt proceedings for failure to comply with a court order, brought
about through property settlements which have been crystallized in the di-
vorce decree, have led to many irreconcilable conflicts. 3 The determinative
factor is whether the agreement is a substitute for alimony or support,4 or is
merely in the nature of a settlement or division of the property rights of the
parties.
The more generally prevailing view is that decrees requiring compliance
with a property settlement agreement are not alimony and therefore not en-
forceable by contempt proceedings.5 The proponents of this view believe that
of the N. D. Const. which provides that all prosecutions in police magistrates and justice
of the peace courts shall proceed by way of information. Compare, § 29-0101 of the N.
D. Rev. Code of 1943 which states that every public offense must be prose.utfd by in-
formation or indictment unless it is one in which trial may be had in justicc, police, or
county court.
10. State v. Trygg, (Dist. Ct., 4th Jud. Dist., N. D. 1957). The court stated that
"when a document, such as this one is, bears a semblance of a legal document and pur-
ports to be issued pursuant to law . . . even though such document may not be actuially
a legally sufficient document, it is a simulation of a legal document which would be
sufficient to the ordinary citizen to indicate that his attendance had been legally re-
quired".
1. Ex parte Stephensen, 252 Ala. 316, 40 So. 2d 716 (1949); Application of Martin,
76 Idaho 199, 279 P.2d 873 (1955); Clubb v. Clubb, 334 Ill. App. 599, 80 N.E.2d 94
(1948); Wojahn v. Halter, 229 Minn. 374, 39 N.W.2d 545 (1949) (It is generally
agreed that alimony and child support payments do not constitute a debt within the con-
stitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt).
2. Calif. Const., art I, § 15.
3. 2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, (2d ed. 1945) § 16.08.
4. Lyon v. Lyon, 21 Conn. 184 (1851); State ex rel Cook v. Cook, 66 Ohio St. 566,
64 N.E. 567 (1902); West v. West, 126 Va. 696, 101 S.E. 876 (1920) (Takes view
that alimony is itself an adjustment of property rights).
5. Buchman v. Buchman, 157 Md. 166, 145 Al. 488 (1929); Frohnapel v. Froh-
napel, 309 Mich. 215, 15 N.W.2d 137 (1944); Goldfish v. Goldfish, 184 N.Y.Supp. 512,
193 App.Div. 686 (1st Dept. 1920) Af'd 230 N.Y. 607, 130 N.E. 912 (1921). But see
Edmundson v. Edmundson, 222 N.C. 181, 22 S.E.2d 576 (1942).
